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Abstract 
The reliable operation of protection systems depends on the 
correct settings of protective devices. The complexity of 
power networks and the large number of protection setting 
parameters make it extremely challenging to comprehensively 
validate the settings. This paper presents the design of a 
hybrid Rule-Based (RB) and Model-Based (MB) intelligent 
system termed Power system Protection Smart Tool (PPST), 
which is proposed as a solution for addressing the challenges 
associated with protection settings validation and 
performance checking. The RB element evaluates the settings 
using rules extracted from experts¶ knowledge and utility 
setting policies, while the MB element automatically 
interfaces with DIgSILENT PowerFactory to populate power 
network and protection system models to simulate and check 
the actual performance of the protection system under a 
variety of operational contexts. A case study is presented to 
demonstrate the operation of PPST, which shows that it is 
capable of effectively conducting the protection settings 
validation and performance checking task.  
1 Introduction 
Protection systems defend power networks against abnormal 
operating conditions by isolating faulty components² 
typically within milliseconds²to minimise equipment 
damage, the risks of wide-area blackouts, and other unsafe or 
undesirable conditions. The reliable operation of protection 
systems depends on the correct design and application of 
numerous configuration parameters within protective devices, 
such as the status (enabled or disabled) of protection 
functions, distance protection zone reaches, overcurrent 
protection pick-up current thresholds, etc. These parameters 
are commonly referred to as ³protection settings´. 
There are numerous examples of evidence which indicate that 
relying solely on protection engineers for decision making 
and validation in the setting of protective devices can still 
lead to some unexpected (or hidden) errors, despite multiple 
instances of checking, and thorough verification and quality 
control processes [1, 2]. These errors may result from 
erroneous calculations, from engineers' misunderstanding or 
mistranslating of setting policies, or from potential errors in 
the process of the application of settings to the protection 
devices or in the approval or commissioning processes. 
Failure to identify these errors may result in in-service mal-
operation events, or even large-area blackouts [1]. 
Furthermore, in recent years power networks have been 
experiencing, and will continue to experience in the future, 
significant changes, with the decommissioning of large-scale 
fossil-fuelled synchronous generation, the introduction of 
converter-interfaced sources and HVDC interconnectors both 
between separate systems and within large systems, potential 
incorporation of large-scale energy storage, the increase of 
system loading, varied fault levels, etc. [3] These changes 
mean that existing setting policies or knowledge may no 
longer be adequate or valid under all circumstances. The 
originally correct settings may be rendered erroneous under 
certain specific (unanticipated) situations. These issues result 
in a strong requirement for a method and associated tools that 
are capable of comprehensively assessing and validating 
existing protection settings.  
Increasing network complexity and the large number of 
protective devices in the system mean that a manual process 
for validation of protection settings can be extremely 
challenging, particularly with the introduction of multi-
function numeric protection Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs), where hundreds of setting parameters may be 
available in each device [4]. This paper presents the design of 
a hybrid Rule-Based (RB) and Model-Based (MB) intelligent 
system termed Power system Protection Smart Tool (PPST), 
which allows comprehensive and automatic validation of 
protection settings as well as checking of protection scheme 
performance. Such an approach is identified in Section 2 as 
being the most suitable solution for addressing the 
aforementioned challenges associated with protection settings 
validation. 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents 
background information relating to protection settings, which 
includes a generic version of processes that are typically 
adopted for the configuration and management of protection 
settings. Based on this, the best stage for deploying the PPST 
within the process is discussed and identified. The potential 
sources of protection settings errors during the settings 
management process are discussed, along with discussions on 
why existing systems do not offer a comprehensive solution 
for the settings validation task. Section 3 introduces the 
design of the developed PPST system and the process of 
setting validation using PPST, where the key advantages of 
the system are also highlighted. Section 4 presents an 
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example of using PPST for settings validation and protection 
performance checking.   
2 Setting of protection systems  
2.1 Management of protection settings  
The specific process for settings management can be different 
for different network operators. Nevertheless, these 
approaches can be represented using a generic flowchart as 
shown in Fig. 1. Details of the individual tasks at each step 
are reported in [5]. The whole process can be divided into the 
following four stages [5]. 
1. Preparation: this stage identifies the need for adding 
new devices or the change of existing settings, specifies 
the scope of the work, and initiates the associated 
activities. 
2. Settings calculation: this stage reviews associated 
documents (e.g. setting policies), based on which 
calculations of the settings are conducted including 
coordination studies with other protective devices. 
3. Commissioning and testing: this stage applies the 
settings to the devices and performs associated tests to 
ensure the settings are entered correctly and the devices 
will operate as expected. 
4. Reviewing and recording: this stage records and stores 
the settings in certain formats and locations for 
documentation purposes. 
 
Fig. 1. The management of protection settings over the life cycle of 
the application [5] 
2.2 Sources of protection setting errors 
Over the life cycle of the protection settings, multiple 
software tools (e.g. settings calculation and management 
tools) may be deployed; documents with different formats and 
versions may be used; and different groups of people (in-
house engineers and contractors) may work on the process. 
Setting errors may be introduced at any stage. The main 
source of errors can be summarised as follows: 
1. Incorrect selection of protective solution. This may 
include choosing incorrect protection functions for 
specific equipment (although this is rare), wrong 
configuration of protection functions in a multi-function 
protection IED, etc. 
2. Calculation errors. This can be due to misunderstanding 
associated policies and guidance, mistakes in 
calculations (e.g. fault calculations), failure in finding 
satisfactory settings to meet associated requirements, etc. 
3. Mistakes in data transfer, entry and recording. During 
the settings calculation, the settings data may be 
transferred multiple times involving several engineers 
and setting sheets or software tools. Any step of this 
process could suffer from human errors [4]. 
4. Other sources of errors. This could result from any 
mistakes during the actual programming and 
implementation of settings on the device, or during 
testing and commission of the equipment associated with 
protection settings. 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that any stage 
in the process can potentially be a source of errors. Therefore, 
it is proposed that a dedicated settings validation system 
should be added as the last line of checking of the exact 
settings applied to the physical devices. This is best 
performed in the commissioning and testing stage (last step in 
Stage 3 as shown in Fig. 1), when the setting file should be 
checked using the settings validation method presented in this 
paper and then applied to the devices without any changes 
involved.  
However, this can be difficult in practice, since the existing 
protection settings are stored in proprietary file formats, 
which means that in many cases the setting file cannot be 
directly accessed by third party applications, and therefore, 
needs to be converted to appropriate generally accessible file 
formats before the data can be read and analysed. These 
inconveniences are unavoidable and result from proprietary 
setting file formats. Moreover, there are difficulties in 
manipulating settings data due to the use of proprietary data 
models to represent settings. This issue can be addressed by 
the work reported in [6], where common representation of 
protection settings is proposed using the standardised data 
model and file format provided by IEC 61850 [7]. 
2.3 Validation of protection settings  
Extensive research on the topic of automatic calculation of 
protection settings has been undertaken [8], which includes 
the use of topological analysis [9-11], optimisation theory     
[12, 13] and artificial intelligence [8, 14, 15]. However, such 
systems performing automatic protection setting and 
coordination are not particularly suitable for settings 
validation, even though they provide very relevant 
functionality. This is because the calculated values generally 
are only applicable to one setting solution, and there may be a 
range of valid settings available. Inconsistencies between the 
calculated values and actual settings do not necessarily mean 
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there are errors. These systems also do not consider checks 
against setting policies, in which the settings requirements 
under specific system conditions (e.g. minimum fault 
condition) are specified. Furthermore, for a settings validation 
system, it is also desired that the policy can be examined 
through the assessment of the actual performance of the 
protection system with the settings that conform to the policy. 
There is no provision of such kind in any of the reviewed 
systems. 
There are also commercial systems providing functions for 
evaluating protection settings [16-18], however, these systems 
are mainly concerned with the coordination of protection 
systems, whereas the settings validation task requires a more 
sophisticated solution. Furthermore, [18] is most suitable for 
distribution network applications, where coordination of 
overcurrent protection is the main concern. However it is not 
suitable for transmission network protection. [16, 17] require 
a full system model in order to conduct the validation process, 
which is not always available.  
The system presented in this paper aims at addressing these 
shortcomings using a hybrid RB and MB approach. The key 
advantages of the system include: 
1) The PPST not only allows the validation of settings 
against the setting policy and experts¶ knowledge in the 
RB module, but also enables checking of the actual 
performance through simulation-based methods.  
2) The provision of the MB module in addition to the RB 
module allows the validation of the setting policy 
(represented in the form of rules) itself. 
3) An equivalent network model representing a portion of 
the network where the protection scheme is implemented 
can be populated automatically from the stored circuit 
and fault level data without the need for a full network 
model. 
4) The entire validation process can be automated. 
Particularly in the MB module, the task of constructing 
power network models, configuring protection system 
models (including IEDs, CTs, VTs, etc.) and analysing 
simulation results, which may require significant manual 
input in most existing systems, have been automated 
through a developed interface with the PowerFactory 
simulation engine [19].  
3 Design of the PPST 
3.1 Overall system design 
The overall structure of the PPST is illustrated in Fig. 2 and it 
contains the following main elements: 
x Data importer: this element imports network data and 
setting files automatically, and stores this data in an 
internal database for the use by other elements during 
the validation process.  
x RB module: responsible for checking the settings 
against the rules derived from the setting policies and 
H[SHUWV¶ NQRZOHGJH, and automatically analysing 
simulation results returned from MB module to detect 
incorrect simulated protection operation.    
x MB module: responsible for performing a further 
means of checking of the settings using simulation-
based validation, which is achieved through interaction 
with the PowerFactory simulation engine. The network 
and protection system models can be populated, 
credible events are simulated, and results are analysed 
in an automated fashion.  
x Database: an internal store of the proposed settings 
data and network data. 
x Graphical User Interface (GUI): this enables 
interaction between the user and PPST.  
 
Fig. 2. Overall structure of the PPST 
3.2 Validation process 
The process of validating protection settings and checking 
protection performance using PPST is illustrated in Fig. 3: 
1) The imported settings data are inserted into the RB 
module for validation against the rules translated from 
the setting policies and knowledge of experts. If there 
are any errors identified in the RB module, the 
erroneous settings will be highlighted, and suggestions 
for potential rectification of the errors will be provided, 
along with the details of the specific rule(s) that the 
settings violated. Using this information, engineers 
may amend the setting(s) and repeat the RB validation 
process. If there are no errors detected, the process will 
proceed to the MB stage. 
2) In the MB validation stage, the PPST will interact with 
the PowerFactory simulation engine directly. Based on 
the protection scheme being tested, appropriate 
equivalent network models are populated; relay models 
available within PowerFactory are configured using the 
settings to be validated; and a range of fault events are 
generated and simulated automatically. 
3) The MB simulation results are analysed automatically 
using the RB module described in step 1 using the 
dedicated set of rules for analysis of simulation results. 
This step is used to automatically identify any 
undesired protection operations in the set of events that 
have been simulated. 
4) If any incorrect operation is identified, this indicates 
that there are still remaining problems that have not 
been identified by the validation rules stored in the RB 
module, either due to deficiencies in the rule base or in 
the policy. These problems could be setting errors, 
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weaknesses in the protection system design, or other 
³KLGGHQ´ SUREOHPV WKDW FRXOG be encountered during 
operation that have not been anticipated or covered by 
the policy. This would allow the setting policy to be 
reviewed (manually) with the aid of generated heuristic 
messages about the identified undesired operation, so 
that any potential weaknesses can be corrected and the 
missing scenarios can be added to the policy in the 
form of new stipulations. When the setting policy are 
reviewed and improved, the rules for settings 
validation can be updated (manually) for future 
validation. 
 
Fig. 3. Overall process of protection settings validation using PPST 
 
3.3 RB validation module 
The overall architecture of the RB module is illustrated in Fig. 
4. The rules are stored in the production memory while the 
input data (i.e. facts to be reasoned about) are stored in the 
working memory [20]. There are mainly two types of rules 
that have been included in the rule base, i.e. the rules for 
settings validation and for MB results analysis.  
 
Fig. 4. The structure of the RB module 
The inference engine at the centre of the process depicted in 
the figure controls the rule matching and execution process. 
The pattern matcher (within the inference engine) matches the 
facts to the relevant rules according to the defined conditions. 
When the conditions of a rule are fulfilled, the rule will 
become activated. If multiple rules' conditions are met 
simultaneously, all of the rules will become activated and the 
agenda within the inference engine determines the sequence 
to fire the rules using a conflict resolution strategy, which can 
be defined by assigning salience values to the rules in their 
attributes or using the default last-in-first-out order. 
 
Fig. 5. Example rule 
An example rule is shown in Fig. 5 to check if the power 
swing blocking function in the IED is disabled for the feeder 
distance protection function as required. The rules are stored 
in text-based files external to the main program and invoked 
during runtime when needed, thus facilitating the rule 
maintenance and management. 
3.4 MB validation module 
In the MB module, the principle of Model-Based Reasoning 
(MBR) is adopted for checking of protection performance, 
which is illustrated in Fig. 6. Protection settings are applied to 
the IED models (provided by PowerFactory) that are 
interfaced with the appropriate power network models, and a 
series of faults are simulated under a wide range of scenarios. 
The simulated results are referred to as observations, which 
are compared to expected protection behaviours (referred to 
as expectations). Any discrepancies between the observations 
and the expectations indicate the existence of problems in 
settings or in the design of the protection system, which is 
clearly important and advantageous to know in advance of 
actual commissioning and deployment of the protection 
scheme. The automatic detection of discrepancies is 
performed using an RB approach, where the information 
regarding the incorrect operating elements and the nature of 
the detected problems is also provided.  
 
Fig. 6. The use of MBR for checking protection performance in 
PPST [21] 
Each protection scheme is equipped with a number of 
validation templates, according to which the network model 
and the fault events are simulated. The validation templates 
contain various scenarios (e.g. maximum and minimum fault 
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conditions) which are based on the protection performance 
requirements (as opposed to setting rules) defined in policies 
and through experts¶ knowledge. User-defined validation 
schedules are also supported.  
The interaction between the MB module and the 
PowerFactory simulation engine is achieved through the 
Application Programming Interface (API). More details are 
available in [21]. 
4 Demonstration of the PPST 
This section demonstrates the use of the PPST for validating a 
distance protection scheme in a transmission network shown 
in Fig. 7. The protection scheme includes IED 1 and IED 2, 
and the settings in IED 1 fails to conform with the most up-to-
date version of the setting policy are successfully detected by 
the RB module.  Details of the errors and suggestions for 
amendment of the settings are provided. In the subsequent 
MB validation stage, additional problems are detected which 
allow the refinement of the setting policy and update of the 
rules for future validation.  
 
Fig. 7. Test network 
Fig. 8 shows the interface for the RB validation of protection 
settings.  On the left hand side, a list of IEDs that are being 
evaluated is provided. In this example, there are two IEDs 
within a transmission distance protection scheme being 
considered.  In the middle of the window, a tree view of the 
settings is provided, where validation results are represented 
using colour-coded indicators with correct settings in green, 
warnings in yellow and errors in red. On the right hand side, a 
summary of the validation results are provided. The bottom of 
the window shows a list of messages that briefly describe the 
detected errors.  
 
As it can be seen, there are 181 settings in the setting file 
being assessed in the shown IED, among which 167 settings 
are considered correct, 3 errors are detected, 11 settings are 
not validated, and no warnings are identified. The settings not 
validated are parameters such as CT and VT primary and 
secondary nominal values, which are not covered by the 
policies. shows an example of the detailed information about 
the GHWHFWHGHUURULQWKHVHWWLQJRI³53K5HV)ZG´ The RB 
module suggests in this case that the error is caused by 
inappropriate VHWWLQJ   QRW SURYLGLQJ VXIILFLHQW
UHVLVWLYHIDXOWFRYHUDJHDVXJJHVWHGVHWWLQJYDOXH
calculated by the implemented rules according to the 
associated requirements specified in the policy is displayed to 
address this shortcoming. The identified erroneous settings 
are then amended based on the generated messages, and the 
RB validation is repeated with no errors being are detected. 
 
Fig. 8. RB validation of protection settings. 
The settings are then forwarded to the MB module for a 
further simulation-based check of the actual performance 
under a range of fault scenarios. Fig. 10 shows the user 
interface of the MB module when the validation process is 
running. It can be seen that the distance protection zone 
characteristics are displayed on a complex plane together with 
the loci of the fault impedance seen by the relay.  
 
Fig. 9. An example of detailed RB validation result 
 
 
Fig. 10. MB validation of a distance protection scheme 
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During the simulation, an equivalent network model 
representing the network shown in Fig. 7 is populated in 
PowerFactory. There are 279 solid fault events applied with 
10% steps along all the transmission lines within the network 
model. The MB module performs automated analysis of 
protection operation for all of these simulated events as 
shown in Fig. 11, which indicates that mal-operation is 
detected in 4 out of 297 simulated cases.  The details of the 
selected mal-operation event are shown in the lower part of 
the window which provides relevant information including 
faulty equipment, fault location, mal-operated protection 
element, etc.  
In this case, the problem is caused by zone 2 element in IED 1 
(in Fig. 7) operates during faults beyond 80% (from the Bus 3 
end) of the length of the line between Bus 3 and Bus 4. The 
reason for this undesired operation is that the setting policy 
recommends that zone 2 reach should be set to 150% of the 
protected line impedance, but the line between Bus 3 and Bus 
4 happens to be significantly shorter than the protected line, 
thereby causing an overlap of zone 2 reach of the distance 
relays on these two lines. Upon close inspection of all four 
detected incorrect operations, it can be deduced that they are 
all caused by the same root problem. This allows the 
refinement of the policy to include additional criteria to cater 
for unusual length variations of remotely-connected lines in 
order to avoid such mis-coordination problems in the future. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Summary of the detected incorrect operations during MB 
simulation 
5 Conclusion  
This paper has presented the design of an intelligent system 
PPST for comprehensive validation of protection settings. 
The management of protection settings has been reviewed, 
based on which it has been identified that the most suitable 
stage of deploying the PPST is the commission and test stage, 
which is the last line of checking of the exact settings applied 
to the physical devices. The potential sources of setting errors 
have been discussed which mainly include manual errors and 
the potential inadequacy of the setting policy itself.  
The design of PPST with both an RB and an MB module has 
been presented, where the RB module uses rules extracted 
from setting policy DQGHQJLQHHUV¶NQRZOHGJHZKLOHWKH0% 
module provides a further means of checking using a 
simulation-based approach, where protection systems with the 
proposed settings are simulated and evaluated in a primary 
network model environment under a wide range of system 
events. The entire process can be automated, as discussed. 
An example demonstrating the operation of PPST has been 
presented, where the system has successfully detected errors 
in the RB module and identified additional problems in the 
subsequent MB module.  The future work mainly involves the 
refinement of the system to fully roll out for industrial 
application.  
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